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Abstract—Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an essential part of most Voice over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP) architecture. Although SIP provides attractive features, it is exposed to various security threats, 
and so an efficient and secure authentication scheme is sought to enhance the security of SIP. Several 
attempts have been made to address the tradeoff problem between security and efficiency, but designing a 
successful authenticated key agreement protocol for SIP is still a challenging task from the viewpoint of 
both performance and security, because performance and security as two critical factors affecting SIP 
applications always seem contradictory. 
In this study, we employ biometrics to design a lightweight privacy preserving authentication protocol 
for SIP based on symmetric encryption, achieving a delicate balance between performance and security. 
In addition, the proposed authentication protocol can fully protect the privacy of biometric characteristics 
and data identity, which has not been considered in previous work. The completeness of the proposed 
protocol is demonstrated by Gong, Needham, and Yahalom (GNY) logic.  Performance analysis shows 
that our proposed protocol increases efficiency significantly in comparison with other related protocols. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) systems have already spread to the markets since they can provide 
low cost and more flexibility implementation compared with traditional Public Switched Telephone 
Networks (PSTNs). In recent years, many efficient, flexible and secure signaling protocols have been 
proposed to boost the application versatility and rapid growth of VoIP. Among these signaling protocols, 
the Session Initial Protocol (SIP) is the widely used one due to its flexible, lightweight and scalable 
design. 
SIP is a text based application layer control protocol for creating, modifying, and terminating 
multimedia sessions among participants [1]. Although SIP possesses many attractive merits, it is exposed 
to several security threats [2] such as impersonation, eavesdropping, and message modification etc, 
because the authentication of SIP is inherited directly from HTTP Digest authentication [3]. There is a 
trend towards reinforcing the security of SIP with an efficient and secure authentication protocol. But 
developing such an efficient and secure authentication protocol for SIP is a challenging task. On one hand, 
the authentication protocol should secure against various types of attacks and provide several security 
features to satisfy the security requirements of IP based networks. On the other hand, the authentication 
mechanism should not involve intensive computation in users and SIP server because VoIP 
communications are more sensitive to transmission latency. 
Since security measures are usually inversely proportional to performance, several authenticated key 
agreement protocols were proposed to balance security and efficiency. The existing authentication 
protocols for SIP can be divided into four groups [4]: Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) 
based, Public Key Cryptography (PKC) based, ID based and Hash and Symmetric Encryption based. 
PAKE based protocols always suffer from stolen verifier attacks and require the communication parties 
sharing a password beforehand. PKC based protocols can resist almost all attacks, but these protocols 
need to implement computational cost operations. Although ID based protocols provide better security 
compared with other types of protocols, the Public Key Generator used in these protocols needs to be 
trusted; moreover, the use of expansive bilinear pairings leads to computational overhead and 
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communication delay. In comparison, Hash-based protocols provide better performance, but these 
protocols have obvious security weakness.  Therefore, how to design a successful authentication protocol 
for SIP to achieve a delicate tradeoff remains a challenge work. 
In this study, our main objective is to design a lightweight authenticated key agreement protocol for 
SIP that meets the security requirements especially privacy protection, which has not been considered in 
most of previous work. The main contributions of our work are summarized as follows: 
(1) Strong authentication: in the proposed protocol, biometric characteristics are employed with smart 
cards and passwords to provide strong authentication. The biometrics demonstrate what you are, the smart 
cards show what you have, and the passwords verify what you know, and those three complement one 
another to achieve strong authentication. 
(2) Privacy protection: instead of storing the biometric template, the protected biometric data in our 
protocol is written into a smartcard and the smartcard can perform the correctness checking by using the 
protected biometric value. So that the adversary cannot obtain the user’s biometric information, even if 
the user’s smartcard had been lost or stolen and the data in the card was leaked. Moreover, the real identity 
of the user is protected by a symmetric encryption algorithm. Thus, the adversary cannot figure out the real 
identity of the user in the authentication process.  
(3) Efficiency: symmetric encryption is adopted in our protocol to achieve lightweight authentication 
since the symmetric encryption and decryption operations perform almost as fast as calculating the hash 
value of the same size data. In addition, the SIP server does not need to maintain any password or 
verification table.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the related work. Section III 
describes the background associated with this study. In Section IV, the proposed protocol is described in 
detail. The security of the proposed protocol is discussed in Section V. In Section VI, the performance of 
the proposed protocol is evaluated and analyzed. And the paper is concluded in Section VII. 
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II. RELATE WORK  
A secure and efficient authenticated key agreement protocol plays an essential role in protecting private 
and valuable information over audio communications in SIP-based services. However, the original 
authentication protocol of SIP only offers one-way authentication and cannot support integrity and 
confidentiality protection at an acceptable level in practice. On the other hand, since the original 
authentication protocol of SIP is based on hyper text transport protocol (HTTP) digest authentication, the 
computational cost is very high on widely used SIP proxy servers [5]. Thus, the original authentication 
protocol should be improved to satisfy the security and efficiency requirements of SIP. Over recent years, 
several authenticated key agreement protocols of SIP have been proposed to address different balance 
between security and efficiency. As the provision of the security features is usually inversely proportional 
to performance, designing an efficient and secure authenticated key agreement protocol for SIP is a 
challenging task. 
To date, many authentication protocols for SIP have been proposed based on either hash and symmetric 
encryption or public key cryptography. These authentication protocols for SIP can be categorized into 
four groups: Password Authenticated Key Exchange based, Public Key Cryptography based, ID based 
and Hash and Symmetric Encryption based. 
PAKE based protocols inherit from Encrypted Key Exchange protocols which rely on the Discrete 
Logarithm Problem (DLP). The main merit of these authentication protocols is simple. Based on 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange, Yang et al. [6] constructed a secure SIP authentication protocol by using 
the pre-shared hashed password. However, Jo et al. [7] demonstrated that Yang et al.’s protocol was 
vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack. Furthermore, their protocol required the SIP server 
storing a pre-configured password table. Based on Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), Durlanik et al. 
[8] presented a new authentication protocol for SIP. Compared with other PAKE based protocols, 
Durlanik et al.’s protocol reduced the execution time since Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) could 
achieve the same level security with faster computation and smaller key size. However, Yoon et al. [9] 
claimed that this protocol could not resist the Denning-Sacco attack due to no usage of random integer in 
 5
generating the session key. Wu et al. [10] also suggested a SIP authentication protocol based on ECC and 
proved its security by using Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) security model. Unfortunately, Wu et al.’s protocol 
was suffered from off-line password guessing attacks, Denning-Sacco attacks and stolen-verifier attacks 
[11]. To eliminate the security flaws, Yoon et al. [11] proposed an improved authentication protocol 
based on Wu et al.’s protocol. Unfortunately, the improved protocol still suffered from off-line password 
guessing attacks and replay attacks.  
The PAKE based protocols need communication parties to pre-share a password secretly in general, 
which limits these protocols’ scalability and applicability. In addition, the passwords stored at the SIP 
server lead to a risk of suffering from stolen verifier attacks. 
Based on PKC, Srinivasan et al. [12] proposed a three party SIP authentication protocol. However, in 
their protocol, the user could not choose their password freely, and the computational cost of creating 
user’s certifications, signatures, and computing multiple functions on the proxy server and registrar 
server decreased the performance of the protocol. To address these obstacles, Nodooshan et al. [13] 
proposed an authentication protocol to move the heavy public key cryptography operation from the SIP 
server to the user to lighten the computational load on the proxy server and register server. Arshad et al. 
[14] also proposed an authentication protocol based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem for SIP. 
Unfortunately, He et al. [15] indicated that Arshad et al.’s protocol cannot resist off-line 
password-guessing attacks. Recently, Pu et al. [16] gave an example to show the offline password guessing 
in Arshad et al.’s protocol and proposed a new authentication protocol based on ECC. Although Pu et al.’s 
protocol overcame the security flaw of Arshad et al.’ protocol, the expansive use of bilinear pairings 
decreases its practicability. Based on ECC, Yoon et al. [17] employed the biometric, password and 
smartcard three-factor to design a strong authentication for SIP. However, their protocol failed to address 
the privacy protection of the user’s biometric. In order to protect the user’s privacy, Hsiu [18] adopted the 
smartcard to construct an authentication protocol based on ECC for SIP, but the computational cost of the 
protocol was very high due to 12 times of ECC computation operations were involved.  
PKC-based protocols are secure against the offline password guessing attacks, Denning Sacco attack 
and spoofing. But the heavy computational load could not be avoided since the implement of the PKI, the 
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certificate revocation management and calculation of public key cryptography are all computational 
costing operations.  
To avoid the use of a large PKI, some ID based authentication protocols of SIP were proposed. Ring et 
al. [19] proposed an authentication key agreement (AKA) for SIP by using identity-based cryptography. 
In order to reduce the delay of session key generation, a one-way key agreement protocol was proposed 
by Han et al. [20] to improve the performance of Ring et al.’s protocol. However, this protocol did not 
meet the requirements of the media security management protocol since it was a one-way key agreement 
protocol. Wang et al. [21] presented an authentication key agreement based on certificateless 
cryptography which eliminates the key escrow and supports peer-to-peer connections. Li et al. [22] also 
proposed a certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol with different Key Generation Centers. 
But the computational costs of both protocols were very high due to the use of expansive bilinear pairings. 
ID based protocols provide better security, and they could resist most of the attacks except the 
collusion attack, because the Public Key Generator (PKG) used in these protocols knows all entities’ 
secret keys. In addition, the PKG needs to be trustable, which is a limitation of the protocols. Furthermore, 
the use of expansive bilinear pairings, the signature generation, and the verification lead to the 
computational overhead and communication delay. 
As VoIP communications are very sensitive to transmission latency, security measures should avoid 
time-consuming operations. Tao et al. [23] proposed a lightweight authentication protocol for SIP by 
using symmetric key encryption and Diffie-Hellman key exchange. But the generation and management 
of the shared key were complicated, which reduced its practical application. Tsai et al. [24] presented an 
authentication protocol based on nonce and hash computations. Tsai’s protocol achieved low 
computational cost, since only one-way hash function and exclusive-or operations were used in their 
protocol. However, Yoon et al. [25] demonstrated that Tsai’s protocol suffered from off-line password 
guessing attacks, Denning-Sacco attacks, and stolen-verifier attacks, and could not provide perfect forward 
secrecy. Yoon et al. also proposed a new protocol to overcome the above security weaknesses. But Xie et 
al. [26] demonstrated that Yoon et al.’s protocol was vulnerable to stolen-verifier attacks and off-line 
password guessing attacks.  
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The hash and symmetric encryption based protocol could meet low computational requirements since 
hash and symmetric encryption/decryption operations are faster than public key cryptography. But some 
of the hash based protocols suffered from offline password guessing attacks, Denning Sacco attacks, and 
stolen verifier attacks.  And these protocols are very hard to design to provide strong security. 
In general, security is inversely proportional to performance. Investigating into designing a secure and 
efficient authenticated key agreement protocol is an intractable task. In this paper, we present a mitigation 
authentication mechanism for achieving a delicate balance between performance and security for SIP. To 
reduce the computational cost, expansive operations should be avoided. Hash operations seem to be the 
best choice of designing lightweight authentication protocols, but hashed based protocols have some 
security weakness. Since encryption and decryption operations can perform almost as fast as calculating 
the hash value of the same size data [4], the symmetric encryption based protocols would achieve good 
performance as hash based protocols. Therefore, we adopt symmetric encryption to construct our 
lightweight authentication protocol. Furthermore, to satisfy the security requirements of SIP, biometric, 
password and smartcard are employed to enhance the security of our proposed protocol. 
 
III. BACKGROUND  
In this section we first review the original SIP authentication procedure and then summarize the goals 
that an authenticated key agreement for SIP should achieve. Finally, we discuss the problems existing in 
previous related protocols.  
  The security of the original SIP authentication is mainly dependent on the challenge-response 
mechanism.  The procedure of the original SIP authentication is described as follows: 
Step 1: The user sends a REQUEST to the SIP server. 
Step 2: The SIP server submits CHALLENGE (nonce, realm) as a response message to the user where 
the nonce is generated by the server and the realm is the digest algorithm.  
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Step 3: The user computes a RESPONSE= h(nonce, realm, username, response) by using the nonce 
value, realm, username and the computed response value, where ( )h  is a one-way hash function. Then the 
user relays the RESPONSE to the SIP server. 
Step 4: After obtaining the RESPONSE message, the SIP server extracts the user’s password according 
to the username and verifies whether the nonce is correct. If it is correct, the SIP server calculates a hash 
value h(nonce, realm, username, response) to check whether it is equal to the received value of 
RESPONSE. If they match, the SIP server authenticates the identity of the user.  
Since the original SIP authentication scheme doesn’t provide mutual authentication and cannot support 
integrity and confidentiality protection, it suffers from several attacks. Furthermore, the computational cost 
of the original authentication scheme is very high on the SIP proxy servers. Therefore, the original 
authentication scheme should be improved to satisfy the security and efficiency requirements of SIP. 
Next, we summarize the goals that an authenticated key agreement for SIP should achieve as follows: 
(1) Secure against various attacks: An authenticated key agreement for SIP should be secure against 
replay attacks, man-in-middle attacks, modification attacks, Denning-Sacco attacks, stolen-verifier 
attacks, insider attacks, password disclosure attacks, server-spoofing attacks, and offline dictionary 
attacks with/without smartcards.  
(2) Provide security features: An authenticated key agreement for SIP should provide mutual 
authentication, session key agreement, freely choosing and updating passwords, session key security, no 
verifier table, perfect forward secrecy, and known-key security features. 
(3) Privacy protection: An authenticated key agreement for SIP should provide biometric protection 
and user identity anonymity. 
(4) Light-weight: An authenticated key agreement for SIP should not involve intensive computation on 
both users and SIP server side.  
To achieve above goals, several authenticated key agreement protocols of SIP have been proposed to 
balance security and efficiency.  ID based and PKC based protocols are better than other protocols from 
the security viewpoint, but they cannot avoid computational cost operations which do not meet the 
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lightweight requirements. The performance of hash based protocols is considerably the best one among all 
the protocols. However, these protocols always suffer security flaws which do not satisfy the security 
requirements. Since the symmetric encryption and decryption operations perform almost as fast as 
calculating the hash value, the symmetric encryption based protocols could be used to replace the hash 
based protocols to achieve lightweight and security requirements. In addition, since everyone’s biometric 
characteristic is unique, and the characteristic could be combined with password and smartcard to enhance 
the security of the symmetric encryption based protocol to achieve the balance of security and efficiency. 
The traditional biometric authentication process [27-29] is described in Figure 1. When a user wants to 
login, she/he inserts a smartcard and performs a biometric scan. The user’s biometric characteristic is then 
extracted through an image processing on the raw data. Next, the smartcard compares the biometric 
template stored in it beforehand with the biometric characteristic extracted from the user’s input. If the 
matching score is beyond a predefined threshold value, the smartcard terminates the authentication 
process. However, this traditional biometric authentication process has some security weakness. If the 
smartcard was lost or stolen, the user’s biometric template stored in the smartcard could be compromised 
easily. And the leakage of the biometric information could damage the user’s benefit because the 
biometric information is unique and does not change in a long time. Therefore, the biometric information 
stored in the smartcard should be protected. 
 
 
Fig.1. Verification procedure using biometric characteristics 
Decisio
Biometric Template 
Yes/No 
Image processing 
Extracted Features B* 
Raw Data
Terminal Smartcard 
Storage 
Matching △(B,B*) 
Sensor 
Score 
Pass/Refuse 
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The above problem was arisen by some researchers, and an alternative verification procedure [30-32] 
has been proposed as shown in Figure 2.  Instead of the biometric template, the hashed biometric template 
is stored in the smartcard, so that even the smartcard was lost or stolen, the user’s biometric template could 
not be compromised, because the hash function is a one way function and it is computationally infeasible to 
find a message that can map to the same hash value.  
 
Fig.2. Checking procedure using protected biometric data 
The method shown in Fig. 2 seemed to be a good solution to provide protection for the biometric 
template stored in the smartcard. However, our research investigation revealed that the hashed biometric 
template stored in the smartcard could not be used to match the hashed biometric inputs. Under this case, 
even the valid biometric input could not pass the biometric checking process, because the output of the 
hash function is sensitive to small noise of the inputs. This means that a small difference in the inputs will 
lead to a large different output. So the hash functions cannot apply straightforwardly to the input data with 
noisy such as biometrics [33, 34]. Although the above solution provides the protection of the biometric 
template, it also prevents the legal user from passing biometric authentication, since a small difference 
between the input biometric data and the biometric template will cause a larger difference between the two 
hashed biometric values. 
Decision 
Biometric Template h(B) 
Pass/Refuse 
Yes/No 
Image processing 
Extracted Features B* 
Raw Data
TerminalSmartcard 
Storage 
Matching △(h(B), h(B*)) 
Sensor 
Score 
Function operating h(B*) 
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IV. LIGHTWEIGHT PRIVACY PRESERVING AUTHENTICATION KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL  
In this section, we present our basic idea aimed to solve the problems and realize the goals. Then our 
lightweight authenticated key agreement protocol with privacy protection is described in detail.  
In order to protect the user’s biometric template, the smartcard should have the ability of checking the 
correctness of the user’s biometric characteristics without knowing the original values. How to realize the 
correctness checking of the protected biometric characteristics stored in the smartcard?  If the problem 
was solved, we could then store the protected biometric data in the smartcard and achieve the correctness 
checking by using the protected biometric value. So that even the smartcard was lost or stolen, the user’s 
biometric information could not be compromised.   Next we describe our solution. First, we define some 
notations, B and *B represent the biometric template and input biometric data respectively. And the 
notation  denotes as the matching algorithm. If the function ( )F ?  with secret key k satisfies the 
following requirements, the use of this function will not affect the matching result, and then it can be used 
to solve the problem. 
(1) * *( , ) ( ( ), ( ))k kB B F B F B    
(2) Known ( )kF B , it is computationally infeasible to get B without the secret key k. 
If we can find a function satisfying above requirements, the smartcard can perform the matching 
algorithm successfully by using the protected biometric values ( )kF B  and
*( )kF B . In this study, we use 
exclusive OR operation as function ( )F ? and a high entropy random integer as the secret key. Since 
Hamming distance can be used to compare the two biometric strings [35], the exclusive OR operation will 
not affect the matching result which satisfies the above function requirements. So even the smartcard is 
lost or stolen, the user’s biometric template cannot be compromised. 
Based on above idea, we design a lightweight privacy preserving authenticated key agreement protocol 
of SIP. There are three phases in the proposed protocol, registration phase, authentication phase, and 
password change phase, as shown in Figures 3 and 4. Next, we describe our protocol in detail as follows: 
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A. Registration phase 
When a new user U wants to register with the SIP server S, it performs the following process with the 
SIP server in the registration phase.  
Step R1: : ( , , ( ))U S ID R h   
The user U freely chooses its identity ID, its password PW and performs an iris scan to generate a 
biometric template B. Next, it selects a one-way hash function *( ) :{0,1} {0,1}kh   and a high entropy 
random integer r, and then computes EB r B   , R PW EB ID    and ( )SR h PW ID r   . 
Finally, the user U submits {ID, R, ( )h  } to the SIP server over a secure channel. 
Step R2: : ( , , )S U Smartcard I T W  
The SIP server S chooses a random integer s as a secret key for symmetric encryption/decryption. Then 
it computes ( )sI E ID , ( )sV E ID s  ,T V R   and W=EV(R) through encrypting R via the key V.  
Next, the SIP server S records (ID, ( )h  ) in an identity table and writes the secure information (I, T, W) to 
the memory of the user U’s smart card. Then it issues this smart card to the user U through a secure 
channel.  
Step R3: After receiving the smart card, the user U stores (SR, EB, ( )h  ) in the smart card secretly. 
Finally, the memory of the smart card contains (I, T, W, SR, EB, ( )h  ).  
B. Authentication phase 
In the authentication phase, the user U and the SIP server S perform the following steps: 
Step A1: 2: ( , )U S REQUEST I C  
The user U inserts its smartcard into the smartcard reader, and inputs its identity ID, its password PW, 
and takes iris scan to generate the biometric template B*. Then the smartcard retrieves the high entropy 
random integer ( )r SR h PW ID   by using the password PW, identity ID and the secret information 
SR stored in the smartcard. After that, the smartcard uses r and the captured biometric data B* to compute 
' *EB r B  . Next, it compares 'EB  with the secret information EB stored in it. If the matching score 
'( , )EB EB is beyond a predefined threshold value, the smartcard terminates the authentication session. 
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On the contrary, if the matching score '( , )EB EB is within the predefined threshold value, the smartcard 
computes 'V T PW EB ID     by using the information (T, EB) stored in the smartcard and the user 
U’s input information (PW, ID). It then verifies whether the following equation holds ' (VE PW EB ID   
?
) W . If the equation holds, the SIP server S selects a random integer a and computes 
1 (( ) )C PW EB ID a    and '2 1( )VC E T ID C . Next, the user U submits a request message 
REQUEST (I, C2) to the SIP server S over a public channel. 
Step A2: 1: ( , , )sS U CHALLENGE realm Auth r  
After receiving the request message, the SIP server S decrypts I with its secret key s to retrieve the 
user’s identity ID. And then it checks whether the ID is valid according to the identity table. If not, it 
terminates the authentication session. Otherwise, the SIP server S uses this ID and its secret key s to 
compute the key ( )sV E ID s  . Then it decrypts the received information C2 via the computed V to 
obtain the information T, C1 and ID. Next, the SIP server S compares the value of the ID in I with that of 
the ID in C2. If they are not equivalent, the process stops; otherwise, it computes R T V   by using the 
decrypted message T and the computed message V and checks whether the following equation holds 
?
PW EB ID R   , where PW EB ID  is in C1. If they are not equivalent, the process stops; 
otherwise, the SIP server S chooses two random integers (b, r1) and uses the corresponding hash function 
( )h  according to the identity table to compute the session key ( )SK h a b  and generates an 
authentication message 3 4( )s VAuth E C C , where 3C PW EB ID b    and 4 3( ( ) )C h a C a  . 
Finally, the SIP server S sends a challenge message CHALLENGE (realm, Auths, r1) to the user U. 
Step A3: : ( , )uU S RESPONSE realm Auth  
Upon receiving the challenge message, the user U uses 'V  to decrypt Auths to get C3 and C4. Then the 
smartcard extracts 3b C PW EB ID     by using the decrypted message C3, the input information 
(PW, ID) and the biometric message EB stored in the smartcard. Next, the smart card computes 
3( ( ) )h a C a   and checks whether it is equal to the decrypted message C4. If not, it rejects the challenge 
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message and terminates the authentication session. Otherwise, it sets the session key ' ( )SK h a b  and 
computes the authentication information 1( ( 1))uAuth h a b r   . After that, the user U sends a response 
message RESPONSE (realm, Authu) to the SIP server S.  
Step A4: After receiving the response message, the SIP server S verifies whether the following equation 
holds 
?
1( ( 1))uAuth h a b r   . If the equation holds, the SIP server S sets ( )SK h a b  as the shared 
session key with the user U; otherwise, it rejects the response message and stops the process. 
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Fig. 3. Authenticated key agreement phase 
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Smartcard (I, W, T)
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REQUEST (I, C2) 
Decrypt C2 by using V
Compute ( )sV E ID s   
Compute 3C PW EB ID    to obtain b 
?
1( ( 1))uAuth h a b r    
Server S
Compute 'V T PW EB ID      
Select r1, b  
Verify 
?
4 3( ( ) )C h a C a  and set ' ( )SK h a b   
User U 
Generate biometric template B 
Compute EB r B  , R PW EB ID   , ( )SR h PW ID r    
Verify '
?
( )
V
E PW EB ID W    
Compute 1 (( ) )C PW EB ID a   and '2 1( )VC E T ID C
CHALLENGE (realm, Auths, r1)
4 3( ( ) )C h a C a  , 3 4( )s VAuth E C C  
Extract r from SR 
Compute ' *EB r B   and Compare
'
Verify  
?
R PW EB ID    
Decrypt I to obtain ID and Check ID in the identity table
Compare two IDs and Compute R T V   
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C. Password changing phase  
In the password changing phase, the user U can change its password PW freely and securely. And this 
process does not require an interaction with the SIP server S. As shown in Figure 4, all steps of the 
password changing phase are executed as follows:  
Step P1: U U’s Smartcard (B*, PW, ID) 
When the user U wants to update its password, it needs to insert its smartcard and take iris scan to 
generate the biometric template B*. The user U also needs to input its identity ID, previous password PW 
and then sends all the messages (B*, PW, ID) to its smartcard. 
Step P2: U’s Smartcard :U (Request new password) 
After receiving the message, the smartcard computes ( )h PW ID  by using the password PW and 
identity ID and then extracts the high entropy random integer ( )r SR h PW ID   . After that it 
computes ' *EB r B   using r and the captured biometric data B*, and then compares 'EB  with the EB 
stored in the smartcard. If the matching score '( , )EB EB is beyond a predefined threshold value, the 
smartcard refuses the password updating request. Otherwise, it returns the message (Request new 
password) to the user U. 
Step P3: U U’s Smartcard (PW*) 
Upon receiving the message, the user U inputs the new password PW
* and sends it to the smartcard.  
Step P4: After receiving the new password PW*, smartcard computes new * *( )SR h PW ID r   , 
* *T T PW PW   , and * *( )T PW EB IDW E PW EB ID     , respectively. Finally the smartcard 
replaces the old values (SR, T, W) with (SR*, T*, W*). 
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Fig. 4. Password updating phase 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS  
A. Model of Computation 
Gong-Needham-Yahalom (GNY) logic [36] is one of the extensions of Burrows-Abadi-Needham 
Logic [37] which has been widely used to formally analyze the completeness of protocols. Since GNY 
has successfully disclosed redundancies or found defects in several protocols, the GNY logic is used to 
evaluate the security of our proposed protocol in this study. First, we describe the model of computation 
used in our work. 
The model of computation used in our work is based on GNY’s model of computation which is similar 
to that used in BAN work. The main aspects of the model are given as follows. For the details, please refer 
to [36]. 
A distributed environment includes principals and state-machines, which are connected by 
communication links. The messages running on the links are only means of communication between 
principals. Any principal has ability to run a message on any link. Any message being transformed on any 
link can also be seen and changed by the principal.  
A protocol is a distributed algorithm which determines what messages will be sent. A protocol run as a 
session is an execution of the protocol. 
(PW*
Password Change Phase:  
Input ID, PW and scan iris to obtain B*  
 (ID, PW, B*) 
(Request new password)
Compute * *( )SR h PW ID r   , * *T T PW PW  
Update (R, T, W ) with (R*, T*, W*) 
User U Smartcard
Extract r from SR 
Compute ' *EB r B   and Compare '( , )EB EBV  
Input new password PW* 
* *( )T PW EB IDW E PW EB ID       
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A belief set and a possession set are two sets which are maintained by each principal in each session. A 
belief set possesses all the current beliefs of the principal and a possession set consists of all the formulae 
available to the principal including the principal received, and the principal has generated itself. 
Principals start a session with certain initial beliefs and possessions. After that, a principal can get new 
beliefs, and increase its belief set. Inference rules are used to derive new beliefs based on current beliefs 
and incoming messages. 
Beliefs and possessions are monotonic within a given session. 
B. Completeness of the proposed protocol 
In this subsection, we first introduce some formulae and statements used in the GNY logic; then set the 
goals and the assumptions of our protocol; finally we detail how to adopt the GNY logic to prove the 
security of the proposed protocol.  
1) Formulae and statements 
A formula is a name used to refer to a bit string with a particular value in a run in the GNY logic [36]. 
Let symbols X and Y range over formulae. We introduce the formulae used in our authentication proof as 
follows and the complete list of all logical postulates can be found in [36]. 
(1) (X, Y): conjunction of two formulae X and Y.  
(2) {X}K and 1{ }KX
 : symmetrically encrypt and decrypt X with the key K.  
(3) H(X): a one-way function of X.  
(4) *X: X is not originated here. 
A basic statement reflects some property of a formula in the GNY logic [36]. Let symbols P and Q be 
principals. We introduce the statements used in our authentication proof as follows: 
(1) P X< : P is told formula X.  
(2) P X : P possesses formula X.  
(3) ~P X : P once conveyed formula X.  
(4) #( )P X : P believes that X is fresh. 
(5) ( )P X : P believes that X is recognizable.  
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(6) SP P Q  : P believes that S is a suitable secret for P and Q.
  
(7) P X : P has jurisdiction over X.
  
(8) *P X< : P is told that formula X which did not convey previously in the current run.
  
2) Protocol descriptions and goals
 
To fit the GNY logic, we transform the proposed protocol into the form of P→Q:(X) and make several 
changes to some notations as follows: 
(1) 1: ({ } ,{ } )s VU S ID T ID C  
(2) 1: ({ ( ( ) )} , )VS U PW EB ID b H b a a r      
(3) 1: ( ( ( 1)))U S H a b r    
Next, we describe our goals with three aspects in detail as follows:  
(1) Message content authentication 
Goal 1: S believes the message in the first run is recognizable. 
({ } ,{ ( ) )} )s VS ID T ID PW EB ID a    
Goal 2: U believes the message Auths in the second run is recognizable. 
({ ( ( ) )} )VU PW EB ID b H a b PW EB ID a         
Goal 3: S believes the message in the third run is recognizable.  
1( ( ( 1)))S H a b r    
(2) Message origin authentication 
Goal 4: U believes S conveys the message in the second run. 
~ ({ ( ( ) )} )VU S PW EB ID b H a b PW EB ID a         
Goal 5: S believes U conveys the message in the third run. 
1~ ( ( ( 1)))S U H a b r    
(3) Session key material establishment 
Goal 6: U believes that S believes that a b is a secret shared between U and S. 
 20
a bU S U S    
Goal 7: U believes that a b  is a secret shared between U and S. 
a bU U S   
Goal 8: S believes that U possesses a b . 
S U a b    
Goal 9: S believes that U believes that a b  is a secret shared between U and S. 
a bS U U S    
3) Assumption list 
In this subsection, some assumptions are made as follows: 
(1) Since the secret key s and the random integers r1 and b are generated by S, so S possesses s, r1 and b. 
In addition S believes that r1 and b are fresh. 
S s , 1,S r 1#( )S r , , #( )S b S b   
(2) The random integer a is generated by U in the protocol, so U possesses a and believes that a is fresh. 
Since EB and T are stored in the smartcard, and the user U holds the smartcard and know the 
password PW and the identity ID, then the user U possesses EB, T, PW and ID. 
, #( )U a U a  , , , ,U EB U PW U T U ID     
(3) Since a b is constructed by two high entropy random integers chosen from U and S freely and 
independently, we assume that S believes that a b  is a suitable secret between itself and U. 
a bS S U   
(4) Since V is a secret generated by S, and stored in the smartcard protected by R, we assume that U 
believes V is a suitable secret for himself and S. 
VU U S   
(5) U believes that the server S is an authority on generating a suitable session key material a b  
shared between U and S. 
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a bU S U S    
4) Authentication proof using GNY logic 
In this subsection, GNY logic is adopted to analyze the proposed protocol. The complete list of the 
logical postulates and the index are shown in literature [31]. The notation (T1, P1) represents the index of 
the logical postulate in the complete list which used to explain the derivation. We show how to achieve 
the goals defined before by using GNY logic.  
(1)The first run: 
1
1
{ } , { }
{ } , { }
s V
s V
S ID S T ID C
S ID S T ID C 
< <
                                                                                                                  (A1) 
According to P1, S is capable of possessing { }sID and 1{ }VT ID C . 
{ } ,
,
sS ID S s
S ID S ID s
 
                                                                                                                                    (A2) 
According to P6 and P2, if S possesses { }sID (A1) and the key s (Assumption 1), then it is capable of 
possessing the decryption value ID and the computed value ID s  .
                                                                 
 
,
{ }s
S ID s S s
S ID s
  
                                                                                                                                      (A3) 
According to P6, if S possesses ID s (A2) and the key s (Assumption 1), it is capable of possessing 
the encryption value{ }sID s  that is V. 
1
1 1
{ } ,
( ), ( )
VS T ID C S V
S T ID C S H T ID C
 
                                                                                                             (A4) 
According to P6 and P4, if S possesses 1{ }VT ID C (A1) and the key V (A3), then it possesses the 
decryption value 1( )T ID C and the one-way computationally feasible function value 1( )H T ID C . 
1
1
( )
( )
S H T ID C
S T ID C

                                                                                                                                    (A5) 
   According to R6, if S possesses 1( )H T ID C (A4), then it believes that 1( )T ID C is recognizable. 
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1
1 1
( ),
({ } ), ({ } ,{ } )V s V
S T ID C S V
S T ID C S ID T ID C

 
 
                                                                                       (A6) 
According to R1 and R2, if S believes that 1( )T ID C is recognizable (A5) and S possesses the key 
V(A3), then S is entitled to believe that the encryption of 1( )T ID C with V is recognizable 
and 1({ } ,{ } )s VID T ID C  of which 1{ }VT ID C is a component is recognizable. Therefore, according to 
A6, S can recognize the message 1({ } ,{ } )s VID T ID C  in the first run.                                          (Goal 1)               
(2) The second run: 
( ), ( )
U a
U H a U a

                                                                                                                                 (A7)  
According to P4 and R6, if U possesses a (Assumption 2), then it is capable of possessing H(a) and then 
it is entitled to believe a is recognizable 
( )
( ( ( ) ))
U a
U PW EB ID b H a b PW EB ID a



                                                                                   (A8) 
According to R1, if U believes a is recognizable (A7), then it is entitled to believe that of 
( ( ( ) ))PW EB ID b H a b PW EB ID a          which a is a component is recognizable. That is, 
U believes that the formula 3 4( )C C is recognizable. 
, , ,U PW U EB U ID U T
U PW EB ID T
   
                                                                                                                (A9) 
According to P2, if U possesses PW, EB, ID and T (Assumption 2), then it is capable of possessing  
U PW EB ID T     that is V. 
3 4
( ( ( ) )),
({ ( ( ) )} ), ({ } )V V
U PW EB ID b H a b PW EB ID a U V
U PW EB ID b H a b PW EB ID a U C C

 
        
                                    (A10) 
According to R2, if U believes that ( ( ) )PW EB ID b H a b PW EB ID a         is 
recognizable (A8) and U possesses the key V (A9), and then U is entitled to believe that the encryption 
value { ( ( ) )}VPW EB ID b H a b PW EB ID a       is recognizable. Therefore, according to 
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A10, U can recognize the message 3 4{ }VC C that is Auths in the second run.                                 (Goal 2) 
3 4
#( ),
#( ( ( ) )), #({ } )V
U a U V
U PW EB ID b H a b PW EB ID a U C C
 
                                          (A11)  
According to F1 and F2, if U believes a is fresh (Assumption 2), then it is entitled to believe 
that ( ( ( ) ))PW EB ID b H a b PW EB ID a         of which a is a component is fresh. That is U 
believes that 3 4( )C C  is fresh. Since U possesses the key V (A9), it also believes that 3 4{ }VC C  is fresh.                
3 4 3 4 3 4
3 4
*{ } , , , ( ), #( )
~{ } ,
V
V
V
U C C U V U U S U C C U C C
U S C C U S V
    
  
<
 
                                                      (A12)                
According to I1, if all of the following conditions hold: 1) U receives the formula 3 4( )C C  encrypted 
with the key V and marked with a not-originated-here mark; 2) U possesses V (A9); 3) U believes that V is 
a suitable secret for itself and S (Assumption 4); 4) U believes that the formula 3 4( )C C is recognizable 
(A8); and 5) U believes that 3 4( )C C is fresh (A11). Then U is entitled to believe that 1) S once conveyed 
3 4{ }VC C  and 2) U believes that the S possesses V.                                                                        (Goal 4) 
According to the GNY logic, we assume that *U S S   , that is, U believes that S is honest and 
competent, and then we can deduce the following statement: 
3 4 3 4*, ~ ({ } ~ ), #({ } )
a b
V V
a b
U S S U S C C S U S U C C
U S U S


       
                                          (A13) 
According to J2, if U believes that S is honest and competent; and U receives a message 
3 4({ } ~ )
a b
VC C S U S
   , which it believes S conveyed (A12), then U ought to believe that S really 
believes a bU S . According to A13, U believes that S believes that a b  is a suitable secret 
between U and S.                                                                                                                             (Goal 6)                
,a b a b
a b
U S U S U S U S
U U S
 

     
                                                                                          (A14) 
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According to J1, if U believes that S is an authority on the statement a bU S (Assumption 5) and S 
believe in a bU S (A13), then U ought to believe in a bU S as well.
 
According to A14, U 
believes that a b is a suitable secret between U and S.                                                                  (Goal 7)
 
(3) The third run: 
1
1 1 1( ), ( ), ( ( 1))
S r
S H r S r S a b r 

                                                                                                  (A15) 
According to P4, R6 and R1, if S possesses r1 (Assumption 1), it is capable of possessing H(r1), and then 
it is entitled to believe that r1 and (r1+1) is recognizable. Therefore S believes that 1( 1)a b r  of which 
(r1+1) is a component is recognizable.  
1 1
1 1 1
( ), ,
, , , 1, ( ( 1))
S T ID C S b S r
S C S a S a b S r S a b r
  
                                                                                     (A16) 
According to P3, if S possesses 1( )T ID C (A4), then it is capable of possessing C1 and a that is a 
concatenated component of C1. According to P2, if S possesses a, b and r1 (Assumption 1), then it is 
capable of possessing a b , r1+1 and 1( ( 1))a b r  . 
1 1
1
( ( 1)), ( ( 1))
( ( ( 1)))
S a b r S a b r
S H a b r


     
                                                                                                 (A17) 
According to R5, if S believe 1( 1)a b r   is recognizable (A15) and S also possesses 
1( 1)a b r  (A16), then it is entitled to believe that the formula 1( ( 1))H a b r  is recognizable. 
According to A17, we can say that S believes that the message ( ( 1))H a b r  in the third run is 
recognizable.                                                                                                                                     (Goal3) 
1
1
#( )
#( 1)
S r
S r

                                                                                                                                         (A18)  
According to F1, if S believes r1 is fresh (Assumption 1), then it is entitled to believe that (r1+1) is fresh.              
1 1 1
1 1
* (( 1), ), (( 1), )), , #( 1)
~ (( 1), ) , ~ (( 1), )
a bS H r a b S r a b S S U S r
S U r a b S U H r a b
            
         
<
                               
(A19)
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According to I3, if all of the following conditions hold: 1) S receives a formula consisting of a one way 
function of (r1+1) and a b marked with a not-originated-here mark; 2) S possesses (r1+1) and a b  
(A16); 3) S believes a b is a suitable secret for itself and U (Assumption 3); 4) S believes that (r1+1) is 
fresh (A18). Then S is entitled to believe that U once conveyed 1(( 1), )r a b    and 
1(( 1), )H r a b    . According to A19, we can say that S believes that the message Auths in the third run 
of the proposed protocol is conveyed from the U.                                                                          (Goal 5)                 
1~ (( 1), )
~ ( )
S U r a b
S U a b
    
                                                                                                                  (A20)                
According to I7, if S believes that U once conveyed the formula 1(( 1), )r a b     (A19), then it is 
entitled to believe that U once conveyed a b .  
#( )
#( )
S b
S a b

                                                                                                                                         (A21)                
According to F1, if S believes b is fresh (Assumption 1), then it believes that a b is fresh. 
~ , #( )S U a b S a b
S U a b
   
                                                                                                                   (A22) 
According to I6, if S believes that U once conveyed formula a b  (A20) and a b is fresh (A21), 
then S is entitled to believe that U possesses a b .  According to A22, S believes that a b  is possessed 
by U.           (Goal 8) 
According to the GNY logic, we assume that *U S S   , that is, S believes that U is honest and 
competent, and then we can deduce the following statement: 
1 1*, ~ ( ( ( 1))) ~ ), #( ( ( 1)))
a b
a b
S U U S U H a b r U U S S H a b r
S U U S


           
                 (A23) 
According to J2, if S believes that U is honest and competent, and S receives a message 
1( ( 1)) ~
a bH a b r U U S      which it believes is conveyed by U (A19), then S ought to believe 
that U really believes a bU S . According to A23, we can conclude that S believes that a b is a 
suitable secret between U and S.                                                                                                      (Goal9)                
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C.  Discussion on possible attacks 
Next, we discuss the security of our proposed protocol by analyzing some possible attacks. 
1) Replay attacks 
Suppose, in Step A1, the user U’s previous request message REQUEST (I, C2) is intercepted by an 
adversary Bob and he replays it to the SIP server S intending to impersonate the user U. However, this 
replay attack will be found in Step A3 when the SIP server S checks the authentication information Authu. 
To construct a valid Authu, Bob needs to correctly guess the high entropy random integers a and b from 
the intercepted information C2 and Auths which is protected by a secure symmetric encryption algorithm. 
Without the knowledge of T and the user U’s privacy information PW, EB and ID or the SIP server’s 
secret key s, Bob cannot compute the valid symmetric key V to decrypt C2 and Auths to obtain a and b.  
On the other hand, suppose Bob intercepts the previous message CHALLENGE (realm, Auths, r1) from 
the SIP server S in Step A2 and replays it to the user U. The user U can detect this attack by checking 
whether the equation 
?
4 3( ( ) )C h a C a   holds, where a and b are high entropy random integers generated 
by the user U and the SIP server S independently and are different in each session. So Bob cannot pass the 
verification process of the user U in Step A3. In this case, no RESPONSE message is sent back to Bob. 
Thus, Bob cannot impersonate or deceive either the user U or SIP server S through reuse of information 
obtained from the proposed protocol. Therefore, our proposed protocol can resist the replay attack 
successfully. 
2) Man-in-the-middle attacks 
In our protocol, the user U and the SIP server share a session key SK only after mutual authentication. 
The adversary Bob cannot impersonate the user U to make an independent connection and share a session 
key with the SIP server S unless he can pass the verification process of the SIP server S. However, without 
the knowledge of the user U’s password PW, the user U’s identity ID and the secret T or the SIP server’s 
secret key s, Bob cannot pass the SIP server’s verification. On the other hand, Bob cannot impersonate the 
SIP server S to share a session key and make an independent connection with the user U, since he cannot 
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correctly guess the high entropy random integer a and the secret information (V, R) to construct a valid 
verification information  Auths. 
Thus, the adversary Bob cannot construct independent connections with either the SIP server S or the 
user U making them believe that they are talking directly to each other over a private connection, in fact 
the entire conversation is controlled by the Bob. The above analysis shows that the proposed protocol can 
resist the man-in-middle attack. 
3) Modification attacks 
In order to impersonate the user U, the adversary Bob needs to modify the REQUEST message with 
fraud ' '2( , )I C and delivers it to the SIP server S. However, without the knowledge of the SIP server’s 
secret key s, Bob cannot generate a valid 'I . Then the SIP server can easily find this attack by checking the 
ID in the identity table. Even if Bob passes this ID verification, the SIP server can also find this attack by 
comparing the value of the ID in 'I  with that of the ID in '2C  . In addition, without the knowledge of the 
secret key s or the user’s private information (PW, EB, ID, T), Bob cannot generate a proper '2C  to pass 
the equation verification of
?
PW EB ID R   . Therefore, Bob cannot impersonate the user U through 
fabricating the REQUEST message.  
Suppose the adversary Bob sends a forgery CHALLENGE ' '1( , , )srealm Athu r  to the user U to 
impersonate the SIP server S. However, without the knowledge of the secret key s or the user’s private 
information (PW, EB, ID, T) Bob cannot construct a valid symmetric key V and the verification 
information C3 and C4 to generate a proper 'sAthu to pass the verification process of the user U. The user 
U will find this attack by checking whether the equation 
?
4 3( ( ) )C h a C a   holds. Therefore, Bob cannot 
impersonate the SIP server S by fabricating the CHALLENGE message. 
Suppose Bob impersonates the user U and modifies the message RESPONSE '( , )urealm Athu  relay to 
the SIP server S. Since Bob cannot guess the high entropy random integers a and b correctly, the SIP 
server S can find out this impersonating attack by checking the 'uAuth value with its computed value 
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1( ( 1))h a b r  . Therefore, the adversary Bob cannot launch the modification attack successfully in the 
proposed protocol. 
4) Denning-Sacco attacks 
Assuming an adversary Bob obtains the previous session key SK. Bob cannot obtain the U’s password 
from the old session key SK, since the session key is constructed by two random integers chosen by the 
user U and the SIP server S independently and are not connected with the password or the SIP server’s 
private key s. So even Bob compromises an old session key, he cannot find the user U’s password PW or 
the SIP server’s private key s. In addition, in each session a fresh session key is generated depending on 
the integer a chosen by the user U and the integer b selected by the SIP server S randomly. Therefore, 
even Bob compromises an old session key, he cannot obtain other session keys as the session 
key ( )SK h a b   is not connected with each other in any manner. Therefore, the proposed protocol can 
resist Denning-Sacco attacks.  
5) Stolen-verifier attacks 
In the proposed protocol, there are no password or verification tables stored in the SIP server database. 
Therefore, the adversary Bob cannot obtain the valuable information through stealing the verification 
table stored on the SIP server, to masquerade as the user U to cheat the SIP server S in the authentication 
process. So the proposed protocol can resist the stolen-verifier attack. 
6) Offline dictionary attacks without the smart card 
Suppose the adversary Bob intercepts all the messages transmitting between the user U and the SIP 
server S through eavesdropping, and he intends to use the information to perform offline dictionary 
attacks. However, the user U’s password is protected by a secure symmetric encryption algorithm, the 
user U’s identity ID, biometric template B, and secret random integer r. Therefore, without the knowledge 
of the symmetric encryption key V and the user U’s private information (ID, B, r), the adversary Bob 
cannot determine whether each of his guessed passwords is correct or not. Additionally, when Bob tries to 
retrieve the user’s password PW from the information Auths, he needs to decrypt the information Auths 
and correctly guess the random integer b, the user U’s identity ID, biometric template B, and the secret 
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random integer r. Therefore, the offline dictionary attack without the smart card is invalid in the proposed 
protocol. 
7) Offline dictionary attacks with the smart card 
Assuming an adversary Bob compromises the secret information (EB, SR, T, I, W) stored in the smart 
card of the user U and intercepts all the messages transmitted between the user U and the SIP server S. 
Then he carries out the offline dictionary attack to determine whether each of his guessed passwords is 
correct or not. Compared with the offline dictionary attack without the smart card, the addition 
information known by Bob in this attack is the information (EB, SR, T, I, W) stored in the smartcard. 
However, the extra information cannot help Bob to guess the user U’s password correctly without the 
knowledge of user U’s biometric template B, identity ID, secret integer r or the SIP server’s secret key s. 
Therefore, the offline dictionary attack with the smart card is invalid in the proposed protocol.  
8) Insider attacks 
In the proposed protocol, the biometric authentication process can resist insider attacks successfully. 
Furthermore, in our protocol, no password or verification tables are stored on the SIP server S, so a 
privileged-insider of the SIP server S cannot access other servers by stealing the identity and 
password-verifier from the SIP server S’s verification table. Therefore, the insider adversary cannot 
launch the insider attack successfully. 
9) Password disclosure attacks 
In our protocol, in the registration phase, the user U sends R PW EB ID   instead of its password 
PW to the SIP server S. As the password PW is protected by the user U’s biometric template B, the 
identity ID, and the high entropy random integer r, the SIP server S cannot find an opportunity to obtain 
the user U’s password PW in the register phase. Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the password 
disclosure attack. 
10) Session key security 
In the proposed protocol, the session key ( )SK h a b  is not known by anyone but only the user U 
and the SIP server S, because the random integers a and b are protected by a secure symmetric encryption 
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algorithm throughout the authentication process. And the random integer b is also protected by the user 
U’s password PW, identity ID, biometric template B, and secret random integer r. In addition, in Step A2, 
the hashed ( )a b PW EB ID    connected with a and C3 is protected by a secure symmetric 
encryption algorithm when it relays from the SIP server to the user U. And in Step A3, the session key 
material ( )a b  connected with (r1+1) is protected by the hash function when it transmits from the user 
U to the SIP server S. Therefore, none of this session key ( )SK h a b   is known to anybody but the user 
U and the SIP server S. Therefore, the proposed protocol provides session key security. 
11) Known-key security 
In the proposed protocol, the session key ( )SK h a b   is generated depending on the random integer 
a chosen by the user U randomly and the integer b selected by the SIP server S randomly in each session. 
Since the user U and the SIP server S generate the random integer a and b randomly and independently, 
the session key SK in each run of the authentication protocol is unique. Therefore, the proposed protocol 
provides known-key security. 
12) Perfect forward secrecy 
In the proposed protocol, the long-term private key of the user U is its password PW. Suppose that the 
user U’s password PW is compromised by the adversary Bob, in order to get the previous session key, he 
needs to extract the integer a from C2 and b from Auths or extract ( )a b directly from Auths or Authu. 
However, Bob cannot retrieve the random integer a from the intercepted information C2 without the 
knowledge of symmetric key V. And he cannot obtain the integer b from Auths without the knowledge of 
symmetric key V and the user U’s private information (EB, ID). In addition, for the same reason Bob 
cannot get ( )a b  directly from Auths, and cannot obtain ( )a b from Authu since it is protected by hash 
function. Furthermore, even if the adversary Bob obtains the previous session key material ( )a b , he 
cannot compute the previous session key SK without the knowledge of the hash function ( )h ? . Therefore, 
even the password PW is compromised by the adversary; the secrecy of previous session keys established 
is not affected. On the other hand, assume that the adversary Bob also compromises the long-term private 
key s of the SIP server. Under this case, without the knowledge of hash function ( )h ? , the adversary 
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cannot figure out the previous session keys. Therefore, the proposed protocol satisfies the property of 
perfect forward secrecy. 
13) Mutual authentication 
In the proposed protocol, the SIP server S and the user U can authenticate each other by checking Authu 
and Auths, respectively. Therefore, the proposed protocol can provide mutual authentication. 
14) Security chosen and update password 
In the proposed protocol, the legitimate user can freely choose her or his favorite password in the 
registration phase which makes users easy to remember their own passwords. The proposed protocol also 
provides an update password phase for users to change their password freely. And this process does not 
require interaction with the SIP server S. In addition, if the smart card was stolen or lost, other person 
could not change or update the password without knowing the user’s privacy information (B*, PW, ID). 
15) User anonymity 
The proposed protocol can provide user anonymity, which is demonstrated by the following proof. In 
the authentication phase, the user’s real identity is protected by a secure symmetric encryption algorithm. 
Therefore, even if an adversary compromised the secret information stored in the smartcard and recorded 
the used messages transmitted between the user U and the SIP server S, he or she could not derive the real 
identity of the user U without the knowledge of the SIP server’s secret key s or the user U’s password PW, 
biometric template B, the secret random integer r, and the secret T. Therefore, the user’s real identity ID is 
fully preserved throughout the authentication process in the proposed protocol. 
16) Biometric privacy 
 In our protocol, the user’s biometric templates are protected by a high entropy random integer r, and r is 
protected by the user’s password PW and identity ID. So, even the adversary obtains the smartcard, she or 
he cannot retrieve the user’s biometric template without the knowledge of the user’s real identity and 
password information. Furthermore, the value ( )SR h PW ID r    can be replaced with ( )BSR r , 
where ( ) ?  is an encryption function with the biometric template B as the encryption key to enhance the 
security of the random integer r. In this case, even the adversary obtains the user’s password PW, the 
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identity ID and the smartcard, she or he cannot retrieve the user’s biometric template without the 
knowledge of the user’s biometric information. 
 
VI. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 
In this section, we evaluate the performance and security aspects of the proposed protocol and other 
related protocols. In the proposed protocol, no password or verifier table is stored on the SIP server, so it 
can resist stolen-verifier attacks and insider attacks successfully. And the biometric template stored in the 
smartcard is protected by a high entropy random integer while the smartcard can also perform the 
matching algorithm to verify the user’s biometric template. Therefore, even the user’s smartcard is lost or 
stolen, the adversary cannot obtain the user’s biometric data. In addition, the identity of the user is 
transmitted in ciphertext, which means that the adversary cannot obtain the real identity of the user, even 
if she or he intercepts all the messages transmitted between the user and the SIP server. As shown in Table 
1, other protocols [24, 14, 15] cannot provide some security features such as no verifier table, user 
anonymity, and efficient password change which are very important security features in implementing a 
practical and universal authenticated key agreement for SIP. Yoon’s protocol [17] provides an efficient 
password change function without involving the SIP server, but failed to provide privacy protection. 
Although Hsiu’s protocol [18] satisfies most of the security requirements, it involves the time 
synchronization problem. In addition, Table 1 shows that Tsai’s protocol [18] is weaker than other related 
protocols since it cannot resist offline password guessing attacks, stolen verifier attacks, Denning Sacco 
attacks. Compared with the related work [24,17,14,15,18], the proposed protocol is secure against  
several attacks meanwhile it provides a number of attractive features such as no password or verifier table 
needed, user anonymity, biometric protection, and efficient password updating, which have not been 
considered or provided by other related protocols, as shown in Table 1.  
We also compare the computational cost of the proposed protocol with other related protocols. In the 
previous work, the total computational cost of the authentication protocol was calculated by adding up the 
execution times of all cryptographic operations directly involved in the protocol. Obviously, the final 
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execution time of an authentication process computed by this approach is not a real time of the 
authentication process needed. In addition, the execution times of some cryptographic operations are 
associated with the size of input data such as hash operation. For example, in our experiment, the time 
spent in one-way hash with 512 bytes input is around 0.003ms and only 0.001ms with 128 bytes input. 
Therefore, the above approach used in related work is not appropriate for evaluating the execution time of 
an authentication protocol for SIP.  In our experiments, the SIP server and the client are installed on two 
PCs over the local area network to simulate a practical environment. The hardware platform for SIP 
server is Intel Core (TM) i5 which offers maximum clock speeds of 2.53 GHz and 4GB memory. The 
client is Intel Pentium G630 processor with 4GB memory which offers maximum clock speeds of 2.7 
GHz. Furthermore, a NIST/SECG-standard elliptic curve over a 521 bits prime field and SHA-1as a 
one-way hash function are used in the experiments. And a 256-bit AES (Advance Encryption Standard) 
(NIST 2001) encryption mechanism is adopted as the symmetric key encryption/decryption operations in 
the proposed protocol, since AES combines the merits of speed and security.  
Table 1. The functionality comparisons between our protocol and others 
Security Attacks and Features Tsai [24] Yoon [17] Arshad [14] He [15] Hsiu [18] Our protocol
Replay attack resist Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Offline password guessing attack resist No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Stolen verifier attack resist No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Denning Sacco attack resist No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mutual Authentication Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Efficient password change No Yes No No Yes Yes 
No verifier table  No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Biometric protection A/N No A/N A/N A/N Yes 
User anonymity No No No No No Yes 
No time synchronization Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Now, we define some notations as follows: 
(1) TE: the time for executing a symmetric key encryption operation; 
(2) TD: the time for executing a symmetric key decryption operation; 
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(3) TH: the time for executing a one-way hash function; 
(4) TM: the time for executing a scalar multiplication operation of elliptic curve; 
(5) TA: the time for executing a point addition operation of elliptic curve; 
(6) TINV: the time for executing a modular inversion operation. 
Table 2 shows computational comparisons between the proposed protocol and other related protocols. 
In the registration phase, the proposed protocol requires one hash operation to compute SR on the user 
side, and needs three symmetric encryption operations to obtain V, I and W on the SIP server side. Then 
the total execution time of the registration is estimated to be 3.422ms.  
In the authentication phase, the user side needs two symmetric encryption operations to obtain C2 and 
verify the value of W; one symmetric decryption operation to decrypt message Auths; three hash 
operations to compute 3( )h a C  Authu and SK. The SIP server side requires two symmetric decryption 
operations to decrypt message I and C2 and two symmetric encryption operations to compute V and Auths; 
and three hash operations to obtain 3( )h a C , 1( ( 1))h a b r   and SK. The experimental results show 
that only 8.73ms is needed to realize authentication in our protocol. 
Table 2. Computational comparisons between our protocol and others  
Performance Properties Tsai [24] Yoon [17] Arshad [14] He [15] Hsiu [18] Our  protocol 
Registration  User side  TH   TH TH 
Server side  TH 2TH 2TH TH+TM 3TE 
Execute time  0.016ms 0.013ms 0.014ms 10.875ms 3.422ms 
Authentication User side 4TH 4TH+2TM 3TH+2TM 3TH+3TM 6TH+4TM+2TA TD+2TE+3TH 
Server side 3TH 4TH+2TM 3TH+3TM+TINV 3TH+3TM 5TH+3TM+2TA 2TD+2TE+3TH 
Execute time 0.744ms 54.432ms 66.077ms 72.505m
s 
103.124ms 8.73ms 
As shown in Fig. 5, the protocol proposed by Tsai achieves the best performance, because the 
computational cost of computing a hash value is very low. However, Tsai’s protocol is vulnerable to 
offline password guessing attacks, stolen verifier attacks, Denning Sacco attacks, and does not provide 
efficient password updating, privacy protections etc, as summarized in Table 1. The experimental results 
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demonstrate that our protocol is as efficient as Tsai’s protocol [24] and is more efficient than other four 
protocols [17, 14, 15, 18], since no elliptic curve operations are involved in our proposed protocol.  
 
Fig. 5 Execution time comparisons between our protocol and others 
Next, we discuss the communication and storage overhead by comparing our proposed protocol with 
other protocols. In the proposed protocol, the secret s is required to store at the server side, and the 
smartcard needs to store the secure information (I, T, W, SR, EB, ( )h  ), where I, T, and W are 128bits, SR is 
160bits, and EB is 64bits. Tsai’s protocol [24] requires the SIP server to store a password table which 
includes the username and the corresponding password of every user. Assume that n represents the 
number of the registration users and the username is 32bits, and the corresponding password is 64bits. 
Then the storage requirement of the password table in Tsai’s protocol is n×96. Arshad’s protocol [14] 
also requires the SIP server to store a high-entropy secret key and a verifier table containing each user’s 
name and the corresponding hashed password. Similar to Tsai’s protocol, the storage requirement of the 
verification table in Arshad’s protocol is n×192, where the username is 32bits and the corresponding 
verification information VPW is 160 bits for every user. Since the above protocols [14, 24] need to store 
the password or verifier table, the required storage increases with the growth of the registration users. 
Compared with these protocols, our proposed protocol reduces the storage overhead at the SIP server side 
significantly, because there were no password or verification tables stored in the SIP server database. 
He’s protocol [15] only requires the SIP server to store the secret key. In the Yoon’s protocol [17], the SIP 
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server needs to store a secret key, and the smartcard requires to store the secure information including a 
symmetric parametric function, a predetermined threshold, a secure one way hash function, a biometric 
template, and a hash value. And in Hsiu’s protocol [18], the smartcard requires to store the secure 
information containing four different hash functions, a random number, a hash value, and a point of 
elliptic curve. And on the SIP server side, the secret key needs to be stored. Compared with the protocols 
based on the smartcard [17, 18], the storage requirement of the smartcard in our protocol is lower. In 
addition, there is no information needed to store at the user side, and only a secret key needs to store at the 
SIP side in the proposed protocol. 
We hereby present the communication overhead of the proposed protocol. In our experiments, the 
user’s ID and the timestamp were 32 bits, the random number was 64 bits, a point of elliptic curve was 
512 bits, and the output of the hash was 160 bits. In addition, the output of a 256-bit AES was based on the 
input of the plaintext. The communication cost comparisons between our protocol and others are shown 
in Table 3. In our proposed protocol, the average communication cost was 1120 bits. Compared with the 
protocols in [14, 15, 17, 18], the proposed protocol reduced the communication cost. Compared with 
Tsai’s protocol, the communication overhead of our protocol was slightly higher; this was because our 
protocol provides more unique features. 
Table 3. Communication cost comparisons between our protocol and others  
 Tsai [24] Yoon [17] Arshad [14] He [15] Hsiu [18] Our  protocol 
Communication 
cost 
608 bits 1536 bits 1408 bits 1408 bits 2336 bits 1120 bits 
In addition, the proposed protocol can resist various attacks and provide more attractive security 
features, so the proposed protocol is a successful authenticated key agreement protocol for SIP from the 
viewpoint of both performance and security. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we describe how to design a lightweight authenticated key agreement protocol with 
privacy protection for SIP. To achieve both the efficiency and security requirements of SIP, we employed 
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biometric characteristics combined with password and smartcard to construct symmetric 
encryption-based authentication protocol with privacy protection. Security analysis demonstrates that the 
proposed protocol is secure against various attacks and provides several security features especially 
biometric protection. Furthermore, the experimental results show that the proposed protocol reduces the 
computational cost significantly. Therefore, the proposed protocol is a successful authenticated key 
agreement protocol for SIP from the viewpoint of both security and performance. 
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